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Introduction 
This contribution considers why states as well as international courts and tribunals should act to remedy the 
gender imbalance on international benches. In my view, the most appropriate question is not why they must, 
but why they should. Arguments that states are legally bound under the UN Charter to address this gender 
imbalance are weak, though human rights law does provide a basis for claims that states must take action. But 
arguments about legitimacy—both normative and sociological—could provide a more persuasive basis for 
arguing that states as well as courts and tribunals should act. In particular, the normative legitimacy of  inter-
national courts and tribunals could benefit from selection procedures designed to help ensure that states 
nominate the most meritorious candidates for judgeships.    
Nienke Grossman’s article on “Achieving Sex-Representative International Court Benches” provides an 
excellent launching point for this discussion about the need for reform.1 In her view, the “why” can be an-
swered by pointing to legal obligations in the UN Charter and a number of  human rights treaties, as well as 
the importance of  fostering the sociological legitimacy of  international courts and tribunals. Grossman does 
not, however, focus on how the normative legitimacy of  these institutions could be enhanced by selection 
processes that are designed to ensure the appointment of  the most meritorious individuals, which would in all 
likelihood include more women. Grossman notes that merit is not currently the “driving factor in the interna-
tional judge-selection process,” as “international judgeships are often used to reward political loyalty or 
advance political agendas, rather than to select the most qualified or meritorious candidates.”2 But Grossman’s 
proposals appear to be motivated primarily by the need to address a persistent gender imbalance rather than 
by the prevalence of  selection procedures that are not necessarily designed to ensure the selection of  the 
most qualified candidates. In my view, nonmeritorious selection procedures are the main problem, and the 
gender imbalance that we see across international courts and tribunals is a manifestation of  it.  
This piece argues that the goal of  achieving international benches comprised of  highly qualified men and 
women alike ought to be one of  the main justifications for why states and international courts and tribunals 
should reform selection processes. The normative legitimacy of  these institutions depends in part on benches 
comprised of  the most qualified individuals of  both genders. The steps that Grossman proposes—greater 
transparency and institutionalized screening—would ideally help to address the gender imbalance while also 
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enhancing the overall quality of  the judiciary at international courts and tribunals. In explaining or justifying 
the need for such reforms, we ought to rely more on arguments about legitimacy, and abandon the contention 
that such efforts are legally grounded in Article 8 of  the UN Charter.  
Moving Away From the UN Charter and Human Rights Law 
According to Article 8 of  the Charter, “[t]he United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of  
men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of  equality in its principal and subsidiary 
organs.”3 In their seminal article on feminist approaches to international law, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine 
Chinkin, and Shelley Wright noted that the drafters of  the Charter included this provision, at the insistence 
of  the Committee of  Women’s Organizations, to ensure that women would serve as permanent UN staff  
members.4 The drafters apparently phrased Article 8 as a negative rather than a positive obligation out of  
deference to member states that were concerned about their freedom to choose delegates and representatives 
to the United Nations. Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Shelley lamented the extent to which women’s appoint-
ments within the United Nations had not attained the promise of  Article 8 as of  1991, when the three 
published their article.5 They figured that at the rate of  change they were observing at that time, the represen-
tation of  men and women at the United Nations would not achieve parity until 2021.6 If  we turn our gaze 
from the United Nations to international courts and tribunals as a whole, 2021 now seems like a wildly opti-
mistic goal for parity on the bench. 
In Grossman’s estimation, Article 8 forms the basis for the assertion that “[s]tates are legally required to 
take steps to understand and remedy the paucity of  women judges on most international court benches.”7 
Grossman extends this argument not only to the International Court of  Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial 
organ of  the United Nations, but also to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, which are subsidiary organs of  the UN Security Council, and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which has a special relationship with the United Nations. Grossman notes in particular that the Securi-
ty Council can refer situations to the ICC, and the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and 
the United Nations covers personnel matters.  
For a number of  reasons, Article 8 provides an inadequate legal basis for arguing that states must act to 
remedy the gender imbalance on international courts and tribunals. First, the subject of  Article 8 is the 
United Nations itself, not its member states. Whereas other provisions of  the Charter are directed to UN 
member states, or to member states and the United Nations itself, Article 8 is addressed to the organization 
alone. Because of  this, it is difficult to argue that Article 8 creates a legal obligation for member states, as 
opposed to a legal obligation for the organization. Indirectly, Article 8 could result in legal obligations for 
member states if, for example, the United Nations were to implement this provision through internal admin-
istrative rules that require member states to refrain from placing restrictions on the eligibility of  women to 
serve as representatives to the United Nations. But Article 8 itself  binds the organization, not its member 
states, and therefore cannot be the basis for arguments about the legal obligations of  states.   
Second, the drafters of  the UN Charter formulated Article 8 so as to impose a negative obligation on the 
United Nations not to take certain discriminatory action, rather than a positive obligation to create conditions 
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of  equality. Many delegations apparently considered it to be unnecessary to include such a provision in the 
first place, as they regarded it as self-evident that the organization would not take overt steps against gender 
equality. In stating the obvious, however, the drafters ultimately took a notably conservative approach to 
gender equality, which merely prohibits overtly discriminatory gender policies at the United Nations. Though 
there are many reasons why the United Nations should encourage gender equality both within and outside of  
the organization, Article 8 does not actually require this. Article 8 does not oblige the ICJ, for example, to 
reform its procedures for the selection of  judges or require states to reform their nomination processes.    
Finally, even if  Article 8 did provide a sound basis for arguing that states have a legal obligation to remedy 
the gender imbalance on international courts and tribunals, this obligation would only extend, at most, to four 
of  the twelve courts that Grossman considers in her article. Highly active judicial institutions, such as the 
World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, the European Court of  Justice, and the European Court of  
Human Rights, fall outside of  the UN system and beyond the ambit of  Article 8, regardless of  how we 
interpret it.  
But Grossman also mentions the Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), which does provide a basis for arguing that states (rather than judicial institutions) must 
act to remedy the gender imbalance at all international courts and tribunals, both within and beyond the UN 
umbrella.  
Article 8 of  CEDAW provides that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, 
on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at 
the international level and to participate in the work of  international organizations.”8 Unlike Article 8 of  the 
UN Charter, Article 8 of  CEDAW is directed towards states, as opposed to an international organization like 
the United Nations. It also imposes a positive, as opposed to a negative, obligation on states to promote 
gender equality. Moreover, this provision is specifically concerned with representation at the international 
level, and is therefore especially relevant for our purposes. A stronger legal basis for requiring states to reme-
dy the gender imbalance may therefore be found in CEDAW rather than the UN Charter.  
Ultimately, however, it may be most productive for scholars and advocates to focus not on what individual 
states must do under CEDAW, but on what international courts and tribunals should be requiring states to do 
on account of  policy concerns rather than international law. Human rights law does not provide the strongest 
basis for justifying arguments about reforming selection procedures because these reform efforts will ideally 
be led by international courts and tribunals, which are not subjects of  treaties like CEDAW. If  individual 
states were to bring themselves into compliance with Article 8 of  CEDAW by reforming their national selec-
tion procedures with respect to some or all international courts and tribunals, then this would certainly 
represent progress. But this would be a highly decentralized, and therefore potentially inefficient way of  
bringing about change. Instead, we would ideally see international judicial institutions taking the lead by 
requiring nominating states to comply with a uniform set of  policies designed to enhance transparency and 
provide for screening. The ICJ, for example, could conceivably amend its Rules of  Court so as to require 
nominating states to comply with certain rules about transparency and institutional screening. While such 
reform efforts would be in keeping with states’ obligations under CEDAW, they would not be legally based on 
this instrument. We might consider Article 8 of  CEDAW an important background norm, but it does not 
ground efforts to spur courts and tribunals to take action.    
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Reconsidering Arguments About Legitimacy 
The strongest justifications for efforts to achieve greater gender parity on international benches may be 
found in arguments about legitimacy.9 Arguments about the normative legitimacy of  international courts and 
tribunals arguably have the most important role to play, though arguments about sociological legitimacy could 
also play a significant role if  researchers were to produce empirical studies that support claims about percep-
tions of  international judicial institutions. Arguments about both types of  legitimacy could provide support 
for the notion that international judicial institutions ought to take action to address persistent gender imbal-
ances on the bench. Such arguments are grounded not in law, but in ideas about how these institutions justify 
their authority. This approach to justifying the need for reform entails a clear shift from arguments about 
what states (or international organizations) must do in a legal sense, to arguments about what international 
judicial institutions ought to do to strengthen their legitimacy.   
The term legitimacy takes on a normative dimension when we speak, for example, about whether interna-
tional courts and tribunals have a well-founded claim to authority, or whether their claim to authority may be 
objectively justified.10 Normative criteria in the context of  international courts and tribunals might, for exam-
ple, include the consent of  the disputing parties or the procedural fairness of  the decision-making process.11 
Empirical or sociological legitimacy is a related but distinct concept. The term legitimacy takes on a sociologi-
cal, as opposed to a normative dimension, when we speak about popular attitudes towards international 
courts and tribunals among states and individuals. Legitimacy in this sense is based on subjective perceptions 
or attitudes. The two can be related—an international court’s popular legitimacy can be an element of  its 
normative justification.  
This distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy is worth emphasizing in the context of  rep-
resentation on international courts and tribunals because it may allow us to better appreciate why a 
meritorious selection process is significant. Selection processes that are designed to help ensure that interna-
tional courts and tribunals are comprised of  the most qualified candidates arguably contribute, in part, to the 
normative legitimacy of  these institutions. Such selection processes can involve states implementing transpar-
ent nomination procedures at the domestic level, and they can also involve international courts and tribunals 
screening the nominees—both are sound prescriptions put forward by Grossman. Judicial institutions that 
benefit from these types of  selection procedures may have a stronger claim to authority because the caliber 
of  the bench has direct bearing on the quality of  the institution’s decision-making processes. This is not a 
claim that international courts and tribunals with well-qualified candidates are more legitimate because they 
are making substantively better decisions. Instead, the claim is that such institutions will potentially benefit 
from sounder decision-making processes on account of  the quality of  the bench. The normative legitimacy 
of  international courts and tribunals is arguably weakened when merit is not a driving factor in the selection 
of  judges.  
Opaque nomination processes at the domestic level thus threaten normative legitimacy not necessarily be-
cause they may result in a gender imbalance on the bench, but because they have the potential to diminish the 
quality of  the decision-making process. On the basis of  current studies, it is difficult to argue that a gender 
imbalance, in itself, negatively impacts the decision-making process of  international courts and tribunals. As 
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Grossman acknowledges, we currently lack sufficient evidence that a gender imbalance would negatively 
impact decision-making by international benches because male and female judges reason differently.12 Instead, 
a gender imbalance may be regarded as a symptom of  nonmeritorious selection processes, and thus may be a 
sign of  illegitimacy from a normative perspective. A gender imbalance is, in other words, a very visible poten-
tial consequence of  nonmeritorious selection processes. 
Meritorious selection procedures could also be significant from the perspective of  sociological legitimacy 
because of  the impact that they may have on the gender balance of  international benches. Grossman argues, 
in essence, that the public’s perception of  international judicial institutions is negatively affected by benches 
that do not represent the general population.13 This argument has a considerable intuitive appeal. When I 
show my students photographs of  the judges who sit on the international courts and tribunals that we study, 
they commonly remark upon or ask about the gender imbalance. Their perception of  these institutions is 
evidently affected by what they view as a disproportionate number of  men serving as judges. But this is 
merely anecdotal. Arguments about the perceived legitimacy of  international judicial institutions are only 
viable if  empirical studies can be cited in support of  the notion that a gender imbalance fosters a negative 
public perception.  
Arguments about sociological legitimacy can and should be supported by empirical studies involving sur-
veys and interviews, for example. Surveys of  populations affected by court decisions or interviews of  
government lawyers who have appeared before international courts and tribunals are, for example, potential 
sources of  information about how these institutions are perceived. But the challenges involved in conducting 
empirical research on perceptions of  international courts and tribunals could, admittedly, be daunting for 
researchers. Measuring the general public’s perception of  these institutions raises considerable challenges 
given, for example, the general public’s relatively limited awareness of  the various international courts and 
tribunals.14 In light of  the fact that major newspapers often refrain from referring to international courts and 
tribunals by name, and instead use terms like “The Hague Court,” surveys of  the general public regarding 
details such as their composition could be fruitless. Do we really expect the general public to have an aware-
ness of  the composition of  international courts and tribunals, when simply differentiating between them is, in 
itself, a significant problem? Yet, empirical studies of  some sort are much needed—without them, claims 
about the sociological legitimacy of  unrepresentative benches are supported only by our intuitions and anec-
dotes. In the future, I would like to be able to tell my students that their perceptions are in keeping with the 
results of  empirical studies, and that efforts to reform selection processes are underway. 
Conclusion  
Proposals for the reform of  judicial selection procedures for international courts and tribunals require 
carefully formulated justifications, in addition to well-crafted plans for change. As this piece argues, scholar-
ship and advocacy on the composition of  international benches should focus less on legal arguments 
grounded in the UN Charter and human rights law, and more on policy arguments about the legitimacy of  
these institutions. In particular, the normative legitimacy of  international courts and tribunals stands to 
benefit from judicial selection procedures that are designed to help ensure that states nominate the most 
qualified candidates, both men and women. The sociological legitimacy of  international courts and tribunals 
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could also benefit from more diverse and qualified benches, but empirical research to support such claims is 
still a thing of  the future. 
